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Mark Pawlowski looks at two decisions on assessing beneficial
entitlement subsequent to the House of Lords’ ruling in
Stack v Dowden
‘It is apparent from Stack
that the court’s primary
inquiry rests on identifying
the parties’ financial outlay
when assessing beneficial
entitlement.’
Mark Pawlowski is a 
barrister and professor of




he new approach to determining
beneficial entitlement in co-owner-
ship cases, as advocated by the
House of Lords in Stack v Dowden [2007],
has been extended recently so as to
apply not only to cohabiting couples
living together in a platonic or sexual
relationship, but also to cases where the
property has been purchased by family
members. In Adekunle v Ritchie [2007]
HHJ Behrens QC extended the Stack
approach to a co-ownership dispute
involving a mother-and-son holding.
Here, in the very unusual circumstances
of the case, the presumption that benefi-
cial ownership should follow the legal
title was displaced, giving the mother a
two-thirds beneficial share in the family
property. 
Prior to Stack, doubts were also
expressed by several commentators as 
to whether or not an indirect financial
contribution (ie a contribution to house-
hold expenses, which releases the legal
owner’s own income to pay the mort-
gage) may qualify so as to support a
constructive trust. The point was briefly
canvassed in Stack by Lord Walker and
has now been the subject of the recent
Privy Council decision in Abbott v Abbott
[2007].
Both these recent decisions form the
basis of this article.
The approach in Stack 
The parties (an unmarried couple) pur-
chased a home (Chatsworth Road) in
their joint names. The deposit was paid
from a savings account, which had been
held in the respondent’s (Dowden’s)
name. Upon completion, the balance
was funded from the sale of a previous
property (Purves Road) which had been
in the respondent’s sole name. There
was evidence that the appellant (Stack)
had done some alterations and improve-
ments to this property but he was
unable to put a figure on their value. 
The balance of the purchase price for
the Chatsworth Road property was
obtained through a mortgage advance,
which was in joint names. At the time of
the purchase, the parties had been living
together for some time and had four
children. The transfer document had
included a clause that the survivor of
them was entitled to give a valid receipt
for capital money arising from a sale of
the property. However, it was unclear
whether the parties had discussed how
they wished to own the property. The
parties eventually separated and the
appellant sought a declaration that the
property was held on trust by both of
them as tenants in common in equal
shares.
The approach taken by the House of
Lords was largely uncontroversial and
already enshrined in basic principles of
land and trust law. The starting point is
that equity follows the law so that, in
joint ownership cases, the onus is on the
joint owner to establish that they own
more than a joint beneficial interest. The
crucial question is: did the parties intend
their beneficial interests to be different
from their legal interests? If so, in what
way are they different, and to what
extent? In the majority of cases where an
old (pre-1998) form of transfer has been
used, it is unlikely that a mere disparity
in contributions towards the purchase
price will attract a successful challenge
to a beneficial joint tenancy. Indeed,
many more factors (other than just
financial contributions) will be relevant
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in determining the parties’ true inten-
tions. According to Baroness Hale (who
gave the leading opinion in Stack), these
may include:
• any advice or discussions at the time
of transfer;
• the reasons why the home was
acquired in joint names;
• the reasons why (if this is the case)
the survivor was authorised to give a
receipt for capital moneys;
• the purpose for which the home was
acquired;
• the nature of the parties’ relation-
ship;
• whether they had children for whom
they both had responsibility to pro-
vide a home;
• how the purchase was financed, both
initially and later;
• how the parties arranged their
finances (ie separately, together, or a
bit of both);
• how they discharged the outgoings
and household expenses; and
• the parties’ individual characters
and personalities.
When a couple buy a home in joint
names and become jointly responsible
for the mortgage, strict mathematical
calculations as to who paid what may be
less significant. In these circumstances:
… it may be easier to draw the inference
that they intended that each should con-
tribute as much to the household as they
reasonably could and that they would
share the eventual benefit or burden
equally.
(Baroness Hale, para 69.)
In view of this, cases where joint owners
will be held to have intended that their
beneficial interests should be different
from their legal ownership will be ‘very
unusual’, according to her Ladyship.
On the facts in the appeal, her
Ladyship concluded that the respondent
had established a common intention that
the parties’ respective equitable interests
should be different from a prima facie ben-
eficial joint tenancy. Most importantly,
the respondent had contributed far more
financially to the acquisition of the prop-
erty, both in terms of the initial purchase
money and subsequent capital repay-
ments on the loan. On the other hand, 
the appellant had made a significant 
contribution towards the substantial
improvement of the earlier (Purves Road)
property. It was significant, however, that
the parties had never pooled their sepa-
rate resources for the common good. Both
parties undertook separate responsibility
for that part of the expenditure which
each agreed to pay. These aspects to 
their financial relationship, in particular,
pointed strongly against joint beneficial
ownership. In the result, the Lords agreed
that the parties’ respective shares should
stand at 35% for the appellant and 65%
for the respondent.
Decision in Adekunle 
The parties (mother and youngest son)
bought the family home in 1989 jointly,
although the standard form of transfer
document contained no express declara-
tion of the beneficial interests between
them. In 2005 the mother died intestate,
leaving ten children. Following her
death, the son claimed that the property
now belonged to him under the doctrine
of survivorship. The other children, on
the other hand, argued that the property
should be sold and the net proceeds
divided between the deceased’s ten 
children equally. The central issue, there-
fore, was whether, applying the new
approach in Stack, the presumption 
of a beneficial joint tenancy should 
prevail, or be rebutted by countervailing
circumstances. 
Although the transfer, as mentioned
earlier, contained no express declaration
of trust, the office copies included the
usual Form 62 restriction in the propri-
etorship register to the effect that ‘no
disposition by one proprietor of the land
(being the survivor of joint proprietors
and not being a trust corporation) under
which capital money arises is to be reg-
istered except under an order of the
registrar or the Court’. This, however,
applying Huntingford v Hobbs [1993]
(expressly approved in Stack), could not
amount to an express declaration of
trust. At best, such a restriction would
only be useful in determining the par-
ties’ intentions where the parties had
actually understood its significance. In
the instant case, there was no evidence
of what legal advice had been given to
the parties at the time of purchase.
In the absence, therefore, of any
express declaration of trust, the question
of the parties’ beneficial entitlement fell
to be determined, applying the formula
set out by Baroness Hale in Stack, by
looking at ‘the parties’ shared intentions,
actual, inferred or imputed, with respect
to the property in the light of their whole
course of conduct in relation to it’
(Adekunle, para 63). It would, however, as
acknowledged by the learned judge, take
‘very unusual circumstances’ to rebut the
presumption that beneficial interests
follow the parties’ legal ownership.
In Adekunle the context of the pur-
chase of the property was very different
from that of a normal purchase in joint
names. In the first place, the purchase
was of a council house by a tenant (the
mother) with the benefit of a generous
(50%) discount. She was not in a position
to fund the mortgage without the assis-
tance of her youngest son, who was also
living at the property. That was the
reason it was purchased in joint names.
Moreover, the primary reason for the
purchase was to provide a home for the
mother. Like Stack, the parties’ finances
were also separate. Also of significance
was the fact that the mother had nine
other children, with whom she was on
good terms, so there was no reason to
believe that she would have wished to
exclude them from her estate. There was
also the inference (albeit slight) from the
Form 62 restriction, mentioned earlier,
that the parties did not intend that there
should be a beneficial joint tenancy. 
In these circumstances, therefore, it
was apparent that the parties (mother
and son) had not intended a beneficial
joint tenancy (with a right of survivor-
ship) or that their shares should be
equal. A number of factors, however,
pointed to the conclusion that the son
should have some kind of a beneficial
interest in the property: 
(1) the property was conveyed into joint
names;
(2) he was jointly and severally liable
under the mortgage;
(3) he was occupying the property at the
time of purchase; and 
(4) he contributed to the mortgage. 
His contribution, however, was signifi-
cantly less than that of his mother, who
had been able to obtain a 50% discount
of the purchase price by reason of her
status as tenant with the local authority.
In the result, taking a broad ‘holistic
approach’, the Court concluded that the
son should have a one-third beneficial
interest in the property. 
Indirect contributions 
The High Court decision in Le Foe v Le Foe
[2001] openly recognised that indirect
contributions may qualify in assessing
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beneficial entitlement, notwithstanding
the remarks of Lord Bridge in Lloyds Bank
v Rosset & anr [1991] that, in the context 
of an inferred common intention con-
structive trust, only a direct financial
contribution will suffice.
Interestingly, in Stack Lord Walker
added to the debate by expressly doubt-
ing whether Lord Bridge’s observation
on this point ‘took full account of the
views… expressed in Gissing v Gissing
[1971] (see, especially Lord Reid at 896G-
897B and Lord Diplock at 909D-H)’. His
Lordship noted that this observation
had ‘attracted some trenchant criticism’
from academics as potentially produc-
tive of injustice (para 26). Significantly,
his Lordship felt that, whether or not
Lord Bridge’s observation was justified
in 1990, the law had now moved on. 
The point has arisen again recently 
in Abbott, referred to earlier, where
Baroness Hale (delivering the judgment
of the Privy Council) fully endorsed
Lord Walker’s views that indirect finan-
cial contributions were not to be
excluded  when determining the parties’
intentions as to ownership of a property.
In Abbott the husband’s mother trans-
ferred a plot of land into his name, so
that he and his wife could build their
matrimonial home on it. The home was
built and the husband was the legal
owner. His mother, however, con-
tributed towards the construction costs
and the couple took out a bridging loan
and then a mortgage. The wife also
made herself jointly and severally liable
for the repayment of the capital and
interest on the mortgage. Throughout
the marriage, the couple’s income went
into a joint bank account and all pay-
ments on the mortgage were made out
of that account. The couple eventually
separated. 
The Privy Council, on appeal from
the Court of Appeal of Antigua and
Barbuda, concluded that, following
Stack, the correct approach was to take
into account the parties’ whole course of
dealing in relation to the property in
determining beneficial entitlement. The
Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal had,
therefore, erred in taking the view that
the wife could only acquire an equitable
interest by way of direct contributions to
the mortgage payments. In particular, it
was wrong for the Court to have ignored
the fact that the parties had arranged
their finances entirely jointly and under-
took joint liability for the repayment of
the mortgage. 
Conclusion 
It is apparent from Stack that the court’s
primary inquiry rests on identifying the
parties’ financial outlay when assessing
beneficial entitlement. The intriguing
question is the extent to which the court
may go beyond mere financial matters
(direct or indirect) and explore the par-
ties’ respective commitments in terms of
their domestic and spousal contributions
(eg as childminder and homemaker).
The answer to this question, at least
for the time being, is that such contri-
butions have only a limited role to play
in determining equitable ownership.
Factors such as the parties living
together for a long time or having 
children will provide only secondary
evidence of the parties’ relationship in
relation to occupation of the home – they
will not be enough by themselves to
warrant any adjustment to their benefi-
cial shares. ■
Until recently, there has been surprisingly little judicial guidance on
the precise nature and scope of the parties’ dealings that will
influence the court in assessing the appropriate division of beneficial
ownership in the property. It will be recalled that, according to
Chadwick LJ in Oxley v Hiscock [2004], the correct approach was to
consider what was ‘fair having regard to the whole course of dealings
between them in relation to the property’. But will the courts limit
their search for ‘the whole course of dealings’ to just a strict financial
inquiry or will they adopt a more robust analysis of the wider
circumstances of the parties’ relationship?
In the light of Stack, the conclusion now is that the relevant inquiry
must be restricted to that conduct which throws light specifically on
what beneficial shares were intended.The focus, therefore, is away
from the court imposing its own sense of fairness or justice on the
parties. Fairness and other matters comprising ‘the whole course of
dealing’ are relevant now only as background.The distinction,
however, between primary and secondary factors may not be an easy
one to draw in practice. How purely ‘background’ factors are to be
applied in the assessment process is not made entirely clear in Stack
– the only suggestion is that, although such factors will not by
themselves be enough to displace the presumption of joint beneficial
ownership, they may be used in providing an evidential context when
coupled with evidence of financial expenditure, from which the
requisite common intention may be inferred.This is certainly the
approach taken in Adekunle, where the learned judge relied primarily
on financial outlay (the mother’s substantial discount) in both
displacing the presumption of a joint beneficial tenancy and in
assessing the son’s beneficial share in the property.Whilst other
factors are clearly taken into account as forming ‘the context of the
acquisition of the property’, it is apparent that financial contributions
play a decisive role in the court’s assessment. In the words of the
learned judge (para 68):
It is plain that [the son’s] financial contribution was significantly
less than that of his mother. On a strictly arithmetical (resulting
trust) basis it would be difficult to justify a beneficial interest of
more than 25%: however the new approach requires me to take
the holistic approach… in order to ascertain what shares were
intended.
The suggestion here is that, in line with Stack, the court’s inquiry
remains limited to analysing primarily the parties’ financial
arrangements, with wider circumstances (governing their
relationship) operating only as secondary factors by way of evidential
context and background.
The nature of the inquiry
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